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Bloomberry Resorts Corporation

Disclaimer: The research and recommendation below were generated by Claude Fable. Please treat this as one input for your own research — not as the sole basis for any decision to buy or sell a stock.

Last checked
Price
2.2500
Trading status
Normal
Recommendation
Sell (rally is launch hype, not confirmed data; VIP still shrinking, no 2026 dividend)Sell
Committee call
Sell
Indices
MidCap

Analysis

BLOOM - Bloomberry Resorts Corporation

One-line summary: Enrique Razon's casino operator turned its first net loss in three years as the new Solaire North property cannibalizes the flagship Manila casino and junket/VIP play keeps shrinking, with a debt-funded expansion and an online gaming bet (FUNaloMAX) still unproven against DigiPlus, and the stock has now rallied 18% in a week on launch hype rather than any new fundamental evidence.

Snapshot
Reviewed July 19, 2026
Index membership PSE MidCap
Price at review P2.25
Recommendation Sell (avoid; if owned, wait for evidence of margin bottoming before adding)
Market cap P25.9B (11.5B shares; down 53% from its 52-week high of P4.82, still down over the past year)
Trailing P/E (2025) Not meaningful (net loss of P2.6B)
Estimated forward P/E Not meaningful; management itself is targeting group-wide profitability only by 2027
Dividend None declared for 2026 (2025 loss year breaks the 35%-of-EPS policy base)
P/B ~0.44, up from ~0.37 a week ago on the price rally alone (book value has not changed); down from ~2.33 (2023)
Debt ~P105.1B long-term debt vs ~P31.6B cash (Q1 2026); D/E ~1.87, down from 2.76 (2022)

Core business and revenue trend

Bloomberry runs Solaire Resort Entertainment City in Paranaque (flagship, opened 2013) and Solaire Resort North in Quezon City (opened May 2024, a $1 billion build), plus a small non-gaming and, since mid-2025, an online gaming unit. Group revenue: P22.0B (2021, pandemic trough), P38.8B (2022), P47.9B (2023), P52.8B (2024), P52.3B (2025, essentially flat). Net income tells a very different story: -P4.2B (2021), P5.2B (2022), P9.5B (2023, peak), P2.6B (2024, -72%), -P2.6B (2025, first loss since the pandemic). The 2023 peak was a post-pandemic VIP and tourism catch-up that has since reversed; 2024-2025 show revenue holding up only because Solaire North's ramp-up is papering over a real decline at the original property. Q1 2026 confirms the trend has not turned: net revenue down 8.8% year over year and a net loss of about P125 million.

Solaire North ramp and cannibalization

Solaire North had a strong first full year: P18.5B in gross gaming revenue and P3.8B EBITDA in 2025, and management still expects it to reach full ramp-up by the end of 2026 (two years after opening, per CEO Enrique Razon). But this growth has come largely at Entertainment City's expense rather than as pure market expansion. Entertainment City's VIP rolling chip volume fell 37% in 2025 and its EBITDA dropped 59% to P7.1B; Q1 2026 shows VIP rolling chip volume down a further 39% to P53.2B and VIP GGR down 29% at that property. Combined mass gaming across both properties did grow 12% in 2025, so there is real incremental demand being captured, but the VIP and premium mass segments, historically Entertainment City's most profitable customers, are migrating and shrinking at the same time. Two casinos an hour apart competing for the same premium mass and VIP wallet is a structural headwind, not a one-off.

Junket and VIP decline

The junket-driven VIP model across Philippine integrated resorts has been unwinding since the July 2024 POGO ban and the broader restructuring of junket operators in the region, on top of softer inbound tourism. This is a sector-wide, not Bloomberry-specific, problem: Morgan Stanley downgraded the stock on weak VIP traffic, and the decline has now run for five consecutive quarters (Q1 2025 through Q1 2026) with no sign of stabilizing. Because VIP historically carried much higher margins than mass gaming, this is a mix-shift problem as much as a volume problem: even flat group revenue produces falling EBITDA because the profitable segment is the one shrinking.

Competition from online gaming (DigiPlus)

Bloomberry launched MegaFUNalo in June 2025 to compete directly with DigiPlus Interactive's BingoPlus, which had over 7.5 million monthly active users. The launch hit "early technical hurdles" and was rebranded and rebuilt as FUNaloMAX, which officially went live July 8, 2026 (a July 3, 2026 soft-launch preceded the public rollout) as in-house-built technology, replacing the third-party platform blamed for the earlier stumbles. President and COO Gregory Francis Hawkins framed it as a dual-brand play alongside Solaire Online: "Two brands, two experiences, one company, Solaire, positioned across the full market," with FUNaloMAX targeting the mass-market, mobile-first segment while Solaire Online stays focused on premium/luxury clients. The platform alone cost P1.9B in operating expenses in 2025 (part of the 16% jump in cash opex to P42.3B) and management is spending P1-2B per quarter on marketing, with Razon saying only that the segment could "turn positive as early as 2027." The Philippine online gaming market is already crowded and DigiPlus has a large first-mover lead; owning the technology in-house removes the platform-reliability excuse for future stumbles, but it does not change the fact that Bloomberry is spending real money to chase a market leader with no disclosed user or revenue traction yet. This is a cash drain layered on top of the VIP decline, not a proven offsetting growth engine.

Debt from the new property

Solaire North was financed with a P40B ("Solaire North") syndicated term loan taken out in 2019. That facility was refinanced in February 2025 on a 10-year term (to 2035) at a lower interest margin, generating a one-time P2.9B refinancing gain in 2025 that flattered the reported loss (without it, the underlying loss would have been meaningfully larger). Total long-term debt stood at about P105.1B versus P31.6B cash as of Q1 2026, and D/E has actually improved from 2.76x (2022) to 1.77x (2025) as EBITDA and equity absorbed some of the load, though 2025's equity base also shrank because of the loss. Management is now emphasizing capex cuts and cost discipline rather than further expansion (Solaire Entertainment City Phase 2 and the planned Cavite casino project are both on hold pending Solaire North's ramp-up), which is the right instinct given the balance sheet, but it also signals the company does not see near-term growth capital as well spent.

Separately, Bloomberry exited its loss-making South Korea unit, completing the sale of Jeju Sun Hotel & Casino in March 2026 for a modest sum (about $4.78 million, with a further ~$2 million due by February 2027), booking a P403M gain on the license sale. This removes a small, persistent drag but was never a large part of the story; it is a minor positive, not a turnaround catalyst.

Dividend sustainability

Bloomberry adopted a formal dividend policy in August 2024: pay out 35% of the prior year's audited consolidated EPS, subject to board discretion around cash flow and debt covenants. The first payout under this policy, P0.0847 per share (35% of 2024's P0.24 EPS), was declared and paid in April 2025. Because 2025 produced a net loss (EPS -P0.25), the policy's own formula yields nothing for 2026, and no dividend has in fact been declared this year. The dividend is not merely thin, it is currently zero, and will stay at zero until the company returns to profit, which management itself is not promising before 2027. This is not an income stock right now.

ROE

ROE has swung from -13.97% (2021) to 16.84% (2022) to a peak 23.39% (2023), then collapsed to 4.69% (2024) and -4.36% (2025). None of this is a stable base to underwrite a P/B multiple; the 2023 number was a cyclical VIP-recovery peak, and the current negative reading reflects a genuine operating loss, not just leverage or a thin equity base (D/E has actually been falling, not rising, through the swing).

Free cash flow

Operating cash flow: P5.0B (2021), P18.5B (2022), P19.3B (2023, peak), P16.4B (2024), P8.1B (2025, roughly halved). Capex: peaked at P21.1B in 2023 (Solaire North construction) before falling to P4.7B in 2025 as the build wound down. Free cash flow: P0.2B (2021), P8.1B (2022), -P1.7B (2023, heavy construction year), P2.6B (2024), P3.5B (2025). FCF turned positive again post-construction, which is the one genuinely encouraging data point, but it is happening at the same time operating cash flow itself is shrinking (halved from 2023 to 2025) because VIP profitability is draining faster than capex is falling. Whether FCF holds up in 2026-2027 depends entirely on whether the VIP decline bottoms before online gaming losses and Solaire North opex growth eat the improvement.

Capital allocation

Razon is deploying capital into a second domestic mega-property (Solaire North, largely built) and a new online gaming platform (FUNalo Max, still burning cash with no proven payback), while shedding the one clearly non-core, underperforming asset (Jeju Sun in South Korea). Further physical expansion (Solaire Phase 2, Cavite) has been explicitly paused. This reads as a company mid-cycle on a large bet rather than one in harvest mode: capital is going toward proving out two growth initiatives (Solaire North's steady-state economics, and whether FUNalo Max can dent DigiPlus) rather than being returned to shareholders. Razon controls the company; minority holders are along for a bet whose payoff (2027 group-wide profitability) is management's own stated target, not yet a demonstrated result.

Verdict at P2.25 (July 19, 2026)

Sell (avoid new money; existing holders should wait for a clear inflection, not average down). Nothing fundamental has changed since the July 12 review: the next earnings release (Q2 2026) is not due until August 11, 2026, so there is no new revenue, VIP, or FUNaloMAX traction data to underwrite the move. Yet the stock is up about 18% in a week, from P1.90 to P2.25, on what looks like launch-hype momentum around FUNaloMAX's July 8 debut and continued press coverage of its rollout (24/7 live-dealer studio, in-house tech), not on any disclosed user numbers or revenue. That makes the risk/reward worse, not better: the same unproven turnaround thesis now costs 18% more, and the P/B has risen from 0.37 to 0.44 purely on price, since book value has not moved. The bear case is unchanged and still shows up plainly in the numbers: five straight quarters of VIP decline, 2025 EBITDA nearly halved, and management's own guidance points to 2027, not 2026, for group-wide profitability. The Korea exit and debt refinancing remain genuine, if modest, positives, and free cash flow is still running positive post-construction, which keeps this from being a distressed situation, but a sentiment-driven rally ahead of any confirming data is exactly the kind of move the vault's rulebook warns against chasing. Neither the buy trigger nor the sell trigger below has fired since the last review.

What would change the call:

  • Buy trigger: Entertainment City's VIP rolling chip volume stabilizes (a quarter without a further year-over-year decline), or combined group EBITDA margin turns up for two consecutive quarters, or FUNaloMAX shows a clear, disclosed path to breakeven ahead of the 2027 target, at a price still below roughly P2.50.
  • Sell trigger (if owned): a further debt raise or covenant amendment tied to funding FUNaloMAX or new capex, or Entertainment City VIP decline accelerates past the current ~35-39% pace, or the 2027 profitability target is pushed out again.

Analysis, not financial advice.

Committee review (July 19, 2026)

Five investor lenses judged this page's facts independently, each strictly inside its own framework:

Lens Signal Confidence Core argument
Ben Graham Bearish 84 Net debt (~P73.5B) still exceeds the ~P25.9B market cap, and the P/B has actually risen to 0.44 on a price move with no earnings behind it, weakening the margin of safety further rather than improving it; the 2026 dividend is still broken.
Warren Buffett Bearish 75 Nothing about durable owner earnings has changed since last week; ROE is still negative on a trailing basis and the price move is not backed by any disclosed improvement in Solaire North or FUNaloMAX economics, just launch publicity.
Michael Burry Bearish 60 A stock re-rating 18% on press coverage of a product launch, with no user or revenue disclosure and no earnings release until August 11, is sentiment, not fundamentals; if anything this is a worse entry than a week ago at the same broken numbers.
Nassim Taleb Bearish 65 The debt load and cannibalization dynamic are unchanged; a rally built on narrative rather than confirmed data adds fragility for anyone buying now, since a disappointing Q2 print on August 11 would hit a higher-priced stock harder.
Stanley Druckenmiller Neutral 55 The FUNaloMAX launch and its press cycle is at least a visible catalyst candidate worth watching into the August 11 print, but there is still no disclosed traction data to confirm it, so chasing the move now is premature.

Conferred call: Sell (4 bearish, 1 neutral, 0 bullish). This matches the page's own Recommendation exactly, no disagreement to reconcile. It also lines up with the vault's trading rulebook ([[stock-trading-strategy-and-rules]]): a price move without a confirmed catalyst is flagged there as a trap, not a setup, and BLOOM's rally has press coverage but no disclosed numbers behind it yet.

Shared flip trigger: four of the five lenses (Burry, Taleb, Druckenmiller, and implicitly Graham on the margin-of-safety math) converged on the same underlying condition: the August 11, 2026 Q2 print needs to show disclosed FUNaloMAX traction or VIP stabilization before the current price move can be trusted as fundamentally justified.

Review history

Date Price Recommendation
July 10, 2026 1.86 Sell (avoid; wait for VIP/margin inflection)
July 12, 2026 1.90 Sell (avoid; wait for VIP/margin inflection)
July 19, 2026 2.25 Sell (avoid; rally is launch hype, not confirmed data)

Sources